Audit-Based Access Control for Electronic Health Records  by Dekker, M.A.C. & Etalle, S.
Audit-Based Access Control for
Electronic Health Records 
M.A.C. Dekkera,1 S. Etalleb,2
a Security group, TNO ICT, Delft, The Netherlands
b Distributed and Embedded Systems Group, University of Twente, Enschede, The Netherlands
Abstract
Traditional access control mechanisms aim to prevent illegal actions a-priori occurrence, i.e. before granting
a request for a document. There are scenarios however where the security decision can not be made on
the ﬂy. For these settings we developed a language and a framework for a-posteriori access control. In
this paper we show how the framework can be used in a practical scenario. In particular, we work out
the example of an Electronic Health Record (EHR) system, we outline the full architecture needed for
audit-based access control and we discuss the requirements and limitations of this approach concerning the
underlying infrastructure and its users.
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1 Introduction
Increasingly often, sensitive data needs to be accessed and exchanged across com-
plex and distributed computer systems. To protect data conﬁdentiality, numerous
distributed access control mechanisms have been developed. Typically, these sys-
tems try to prevent illegitimate actions before their occurrence, by deciding on the
ﬂy if access should be granted or not.
To see why sometimes a diﬀerent approach is needed, consider the speciﬁc issue
of the modernization of health care systems. Roughly, Electronic Health Record
(EHR) systems must fulﬁll two requirements [16]: (1) To provide high-quality health
care, the EHR must be immediately available, preferably across the boundaries of
the diﬀerent hospitals and abroad. (2) To protect the patient’s privacy, the EHR
must remain conﬁdential and should be disclosed only according to the law and/or
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the patient’s explicit consent. The latter requirement is particularly important in a
country such as The Netherlands, where medical insurances are privatized and the
patients’ medical data is worth millions.
Note that fulﬁlling both requirements is hard. To fulﬁll the ﬁrst requirement, the
mechanism should be relatively simple and fast. The second requirement however
states that access should only be granted under precise conditions and circum-
stances. Considering the complexity of the medical work ﬂow, the large number of
health records and the variety of institutions, users and systems involved, it seems
likely that checking these circumstances and conditions is slow and prone to errors.
Besides the problem of designing a fast access control mechanism that at the
same time takes into account complex conditions [1,3,8], it is considered impossible,
in general, to design an access control mechanism that models every circumstance
perfectly [11]; in other words, there are always exceptional, unforeseen circum-
stances. This is an important issue in the EHR setting, given the mobility of
patients and staﬀ, and the urgency of health care. We believe that at least it should
be possible for medical staﬀ to self-authorize exceptions to rules, while leaving the
process of justifying the exceptions for later.
In this paper we show how the Audit Logic [4,7], an a-posteriori access control
framework, can be used in the EHR setting. In the Audit Logic framework, a-priori
access control is minimized to the mere authentication of users and objects, and
their basic authorizations. More complex security procedures are performed in an
a-posteriori auditing mechanism. Here we formalize a scenario involving medical
personnel and health records to show how this access control mechanism works
in practice. Finally we discuss the main advantages and drawbacks of using an
a-posteriori access control mechanism rather than a preventive one in the speciﬁc
EHR scenario.
Related work
The Cassandra system [3] was designed to implement an a-priori access control
mechanism in an EHR system. The authors test the expressivity of the Cassandra
policy language by expressing existing policies regarding access to medical data and
activation of medical roles. The policy languages used in the Cassandra system are
diﬀerent ﬂavors of Datalog with constraints. While Cassandra’s policy language is
in theory undecidable, it is argued that this is not problematic in practice. On the
other hand, the Audit Logic policy language that we use is not based on Datalog,
but on a fragment of ﬁrst-order logic [5] (which is semi-decidable).
Rissanen et al. [11] address the issue of how to override safely the decisions of
a preventive access control system called the Privilege Calculus. At each override
a procedure starts to ﬁnd the appropriate authority which is notiﬁed to audit the
override. In our approach there is only a minimal preventive access control mecha-
nism, which can not be overriden. Moreover, in our approach it is up to the auditors
to decide when and which users to audit.
The policy language used in our framework is most closely related to Binder [1].
In Binder delegation is also modeled with the says predicate, which, however, may
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not be nested inside another says predicate, to keep the language decidable. This
restriction is absent in the Audit Logic, and it was shown that the corresponding
logic is semi-decidable [5]. Halpern and Weissman [8] also use ﬁrst-order logic to
model security policies. Their setting is centralized and they do not consider a
special connective to express delegations.
A related problem is the enforcement of copyrights in content-sharing systems
(DRM). It has been argued that DRM can be used to enforce privacy policies.
For instance, Conrado et al. [6] propose to use DRM to enable privacy in content-
sharing systems and vice versa to use privacy as a driver for a wider use of DRM
enabled devices. DRM however, unlike the Audit Logic, requires special (compliant)
hardware or software at the application layer. This makes DRM unsuitable for EHR
systems or enterprise-privacy systems.
In the context of DRM, a type of a-posteriori access control was proposed by
Shmatikov and Talcott [14]. There, a reputation-based trust management (TM)
model is presented, in which the reputation of individual agents is determined by the
fulﬁlment or violation of (DRM) licenses. We believe that Trust Management [10],
coupled with auditing, may be an interesting solution, especially in large distributed
EHR systems.
The justiﬁcation proofs in the Audit Logic framework are based on a formal logic.
A number of distributed access control models are based on formal logics (see the
survey by Abadi [1]). In these models an authorization request or an authentication
credential corresponds to a logical formula and the authorization or authentication
decision corresponds to a proof of the formula. In the PCA framework [2], proposed
by Appel and Felten, higher-order logic proofs are generated by the clients, proving
that they have the authorization to access webservers. The undecidability of proof
ﬁnding in higher order logic is not a problem in their setting, because it is the user’s
task to ﬁnd the proofs. A similar construction is used in the Audit Logic, where
users show auditors that they are accountable by submitting formal proofs, that
can be checked automatically.
2 Architecture
In this section we recapitulate the main deﬁnitions of the Audit Logic. We refer to
earlier work for a more complete description [4].
Policies and Actions
The framework is based on a group of agents executing actions, that can be au-
dited to check whether their actions comply with the relevant (privacy) policies.
Actions are modeled by a set of predicates Act. The basic set of actions contains
comm(a, b, φ) and creates(a, d): creates(a, d) represents the creation of a piece of
data d by agent a, while comm(a, b, φ) denotes the communication of policy φ from
agent a to agent b. By communicating policies agents delegate rights to other
agents to execute certain actions. In addition to the basic actions, there may be
scenario-speciﬁc actions such as read(a, d), expressing the action of a reading d, or
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giveDrug(a, b, c), expressing that a administers b a drug c. Policies are built using
a set of atomic predicates, which can be either permissions, or conditions. The
basic permission is owns(a, d) expressing that a owns d. Additionally, one may have
scenario-speciﬁc predicates such as mayRead(a, d), expressing the permission that
a may execute the reads action on d, or the condition isNurse(a), expressing that
agent a is a nurse. Complex policies are built from permissions and conditions using
logical connectives. The grammar of the policy language is [4]:
φ ::= φ ∧ φ | ∀o. φ | φ → φ | a says φ to b | !α → φ | ?α → φ |
::= p(o1, ..., on)| a owns d | .
Here o are objects or variables of the appropriate sort, and !α → φ and ?α → φ
express use once and use many obligations, respectively. For example the policy
Each time a nurse gives drug to a patient, agent c can bill that patient is written
as: (
isNurse(x) ∧ isPatient(y)
)
→
(
!giveDrug(x, y, c) → mayBill(c, y)
)
Use-once obligations require special care, in the distributed setting we are consid-
ering, to ensure that they are used only to justify a single action [4]. The owns
predicate models ownership of data, which gives the permission to derive any policy
concerning this data, including the permission to delegate permissions about it to
other agents. The connectives ∧, → and ∀ are treated as usual. The says construct
is a special connective used to express the permission to delegate policies. For ex-
ample, the policy Any doctor can delegate to a nurse, the treatment of his patient.
is written as
∀x, y, z.
(
isDoctorOf(x, y) ∧ isNurse(z)
)
→ x says mayTreat(z, y) to z.
Our logic allows to derive permissions from a set of actions. We refer to earlier
work for a more complete description of the underlying derivation system [5]. Here
it is important to be aware of the fact that when an agent a can derive (b says φ to a)
then a can also derive φ.
Logging and Accountability
In the Audit Logic, similarly to what happens in proof-carrying code frame-
works [2,17], when an action of an agent is audited, by an auditor, the agent has to
present a justiﬁcation proof for it. The agent may use (part of) its log as evidence
in the justiﬁcation proof.
For example, consider the two actions executed by agents a and b in Figure 1:
In step (1) agent a communicates the policy φ to agent b and agent b logs this
communication (2), for later. Agent b reads data d (3) and at some moment (4) the
Auditing Authority ﬁnds this action in some audit trail, in this case the log of queries
executed at some database. The auditor decides to ask agent b for justiﬁcation
(5). Agent b justiﬁes, and uses the logged evidence (in step 2) of agent a’s policy
communication. The auditing authority now asks agent a for a justiﬁcation of
having said φ to b.
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Fig. 1. An overview of the architecture. Agents execute actions and keep logs in order to respond to a
possible audit later on. Dotted arrows denote interactions with an auditor. In the picture φ denotes the
policy mayRead(b, d).
A formal proof system, denoted , is used to derive justiﬁcation proofs from
evidences in the log. Informally, an agent a can justify an action α from an excerpt
 of its log, by proving that
 a φ(α)
where φ is the proof-obligation for the action α. For example, suppose that
the proof-obligation for the action read(a, d) is the formula mayRead(a, d), then
to justify the action read(a, d) to an auditor, agent a has to supply a proof of
 a mayRead(a, d). This proof can then be checked by the auditor. Here we are not
interested in specifying how auditors collect evidence and which actions should be
audited by the auditors [13]. More details regarding proof-obligations can be found
in earlier work [4].
In the event of an audit, an agent needs to ﬁnd justiﬁcation proofs based on its
log. This involves reasoning about possibly complex policies and actions, hence we
need a theorem prover. Moreover, a tool is needed for the auditors to check the
justiﬁcation proofs; this is an automatic proof checker.
The tool architecture for ﬁnding and checking proofs are depicted in Figure 2.
For reasons of safety and eﬃciency both tools are implemented separately using
diﬀerent systems [5]: The proof checker uses Twelf, the proof ﬁnder uses SWI
Prolog. Shortly, the reason for this distinction is that proof ﬁnding is much harder
than proof checking. Prolog is a fast application for ﬁnding proofs, but the code can
be hard to verify for soundness. Proof checking on the other hand is much easier,
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Fig. 2. An overview of the tools for the framework: The proof checker and the proof ﬁnder.
and can be done by type-checking. Our type-checker is coded in a few lines of Twelf
code which can be checked manually for soundness.
Figure 2 shows how the tools are used in the framework. Assume that an agent a
has performed an action α and that the auditing authority wants a to justify α.
First, (1) agent a is audited for action α. Agent a now selects an excerpt  of its log
and a policy φ that is a’s proof obligation for action α and (2) tries to ﬁnd a proof
of  a φ using the proof ﬁnder. Then (3) the proof π and the excerpt  are sent
to the auditor for checking (4) and ﬁnally, (5) the auditor checks that π is indeed
a proof of  a φ by using the proof checker (6). The syntax of the proofs can be
seen in Figure 5.
Case Study
To show how the Audit Logic can be used in an EHR setting, we describe a simple
scenario involving health records and medical personnel.
Medical records need to be processed and accessed by numerous systems in
diﬀerent places. To protect the patient’s privacy and the privacy of medical per-
sonnel, users can specify policies that describe who can access the medical record
and under which circumstances. In the sequel, we ignore the issues of moving the
medical record from one system to the other, instead we focus on the policies that
accompany the medical record.
Setup
The agents involved here are patients, doctors, nurses and administrative employ-
ees; the users of the EHR system. The data consists of the medical records and
the actions we consider are reading a medical record, updating a medical record,
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administering medicines and billing a patient for them (cf. Section 2).
The form of the medical records we consider is inspired by the legal directives
on privacy of health records [15,16]. A medical record is divided into two parts:
ﬁrst, the personal information, PI, records all non-medical information related to
the patient, like billing information, and information regarding the patient’s family
members (which may have medical records of their own). Second, the medical data
(MD) gathers all the medical information of the patient, like diagnoses and given
prescriptions. Updates to the medical record are performed by appending new
information together with the name of the agent making the update.
Additionally, several auditors have the mandate of controlling that the medical
records are used appropriately, i.e. the hospital’s internal auditor, a government
authority and a patient union representative. Independently, these auditors may
audit diﬀerent sections of the organization.
The hospital has deﬁned a general policy, φh, to protect the privacy of patients
and allows medical personnel to access and handle the necessary health information:
H1 A patient may read and update the PI section of his medical record and authorize
others to do so;
H2 A patient may read and update the MD section of his medical record and authorize
others to do so;
H3 A doctor may read the PI section of the medical records of his patients;
H4 A doctor may read and update the MD section of the medical record of his
patients;
H5 A doctor may give medicines to his patients;
H6 A doctor can delegate to a nurse on his staﬀ the administering of medicines;
H7 An administration employee may bill a patient each time someone has given
medicines to that patient;
In Figure 3 the hospital’s policy is formalized using the policy grammar from Sec-
tion 2.
Additional customized policies may be added later to this general policy by the
individual users, for example explicit patient consent given to medical staﬀ. Users
may send policies to each other by using email.
Note that in this setting whatever is not explicitly mentioned in a policy, is not
permitted, and that each policy added entails more permissions (monotonicity). A
special mechanism would be required to model explicit prohibitions, basically to
ensure the proper propagation of these prohibitions in a distributed setting. For an
example of such a mechanism we refer to the revocation mechanism of SPKI/SDSI.
2.1 Scenario
Let us instantiate the general setting to a concrete instance. We have patients Alice
and Bob, doctors David and Diana, a nurse Natalie and an administrative employee
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H1 ∀a, d.
`
isPatient(a) ∧ isPI(a, d)
´
→ owns(a, d).
H2 ∀a, d.
`
isPatient(a) ∧ isMD(a, d)
´
→ owns(a, d).
H3 ∀a, b.
`
isDoctorOf(b, a) ∧ isPI(a, d)
´
→ mayRead(b, d).
H4 ∀a, b.
`
isDoctorOf(b, a) ∧ isMD(a, d)
´
→
`
mayRead(b, d) ∧mayUpdate(b, d)
´
.
H5 ∀a, b, c.isDoctorOf(b, a)→ mayGiveDrug(b, a, c)
H6 ∀a, b, c, d.
`
isDoctorOf(b, a) ∧ onStaﬀOf(c, b)
´
→ b says mayGiveDrug(c, a, d) to c.
H7 ∀a, b, c, d.isAdministration(c)→
`
!giveDrug(b, a, d)→ mayBill(c, a, d)
´
.
Fig. 3. The hospital’s policy written in the Audit Logic’s policy language.
called Charlie. Alice trusts doctor David to give her medical ﬁle to other doctors,
in case other doctors need to read it, say to get a second opinion. Alice’s policy φa
is in words: Dr. David can delegate the permission to read the MD section of Alice’s
medical record. It is formalized as follows:
∀b, d
(
isMD(alice, d) ∧ isDoctor(b)
)
→ david says mayRead(b, d) to b.
Alice’s policy, hence, is more speciﬁc than the rules in the hospital’s policy. The
hospital’s policy states that only (H4) Alice’s doctor may read her medical ﬁle. Alice
now gives the permission to David, to give read permission also to other doctors.
Note that this last
Let us see a sequence of actions performed by the users.
A1 The hospital gives its policy to Dr. David.
A2 Dr. David logs this for later.
A3 Alice becomes patient of Dr. David.
A4 Dr. David logs this for later.
A5 Alice meets Dr. David in his oﬃce.
A6 Dr. David reads the PI section of Alice’s record, to remind himself of Alice’s
personal details.
A7 Alice communicates her new policy φa to Dr. David.
A8 Dr. David logs this communication for later.
A9 Dr. David updates the MD section of Alice’s record.
These actions are formalized in the appendix. Note that Dr. David logs the events
A1, A3 and A7, because the evidence of these events may be useful for him later
on. For example, Dr. David can use A8 later on to prove that he was allowed to
show Alice’s ﬁle to another doctor. The auditors on the other hand may keep an
independent (e.g. random) track of actions, in so-called audit trails. In particular,
the hospital’s privacy oﬃcer routinely monitors the queries to a database with med-
ical records, both to detect anomalous behavior and to ensure that the hospital’s
policy is adhered to. The emails between Dr. David and patient Alice, possibly
M.A.C. Dekker, S. Etalle / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 168 (2007) 221–236228
containing policies are not monitored by the hospital’s privacy oﬃcer. They may
become known to him only because some user uses the policy communication in
some justiﬁcation proof. Independently, an external auditor controls the ﬁnancial
accountability of the hospital, i.e. to ensure that only actual costs are billed to
patients.
After some time, the hospital’s privacy oﬃcer asks Dr. David for a justiﬁcation
for having accessed Alice’s ﬁle. To give a justiﬁcation Dr. David needs to show to
the auditor the log entries corresponding to A2 and A4 from the sequence above,
and a proof that:
[A2, A4] david mayRead(david, alice).
David’s proof is automatically checked and the auditor ﬁnds that David is account-
able.
Now, unexpectedly, Alice arrives injured at the hospital, while Dr, David is oﬀ
duty. Dr. Diana who is on a shift with nurse Natalie, treats Alice upon arrival:
B1 Dr. Diana logs that Natalie is a nurse on his shift.
Informally Alice asks for treatment.
B2 Dr. Diana reads the MD section of Alice’s medical record.
B3 Dr. Diana updates the MD section of Alice’s record.
Informally Dr. Diana tells nurse Natalie to give Alice the medicine Qurol.
B4 Natalie administers the medicine.
B5 Natalie notiﬁes billing that Qurol was given to Alice.
B6 Charlie logs this for later.
B7 Charlie bills Alice for the medicine.
B8 Charlie logs this, together with a reference to Natalie’s notiﬁcation.
The actions in this sequence are shown in Figure 4 and formalized in the appendix.
Note that both Diana and Natalie operated initially without proper authorizations.
Alice’s assertion that she is/consents to being Diana’s patient was missing. More-
over, Natalie should have had Diana’s explicit authorization to administer Qurol.
Say half an hour later, when Alice is a bit better, she authorizes Diana, and, say
when the shift is over, Diana authorizes Natalie:
B9 Alice becomes patient of Dr. Diana.
B10 Dr. Diana logs this for later.
B11 Dr. Diana tells nurse Natalie to give Alice the medicine Qurol.
B12 Natalie logs this for later.
Note that the medical staﬀ ﬁrst treats Alice and then records the necessary details
for administration and accountability. Although initially not all the authorizations
were available, a-posteriori, the operators can account for their actions. For exam-
ple, when Alice is asked to account for giving Qurol to Alice, she can send the log
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Fig. 4. The sequence of actions involving the patient Alice, where ”auth. Q” denotes Dr. Diana’s authoriza-
tion for nurse Natalie to give the medicine Qurol, and ”consent” denotes Alice’s explicit consent to being
treated by Dr. Diana.
[H5]
`
isDoctorOf(diana, alice) ∧ isStaﬀOf(natalie, diana)
´
→ diana says mayGiveDrug(natalie, alice, qurol) to c.
∀e
[B1] [B9]
isDoctorOf(diana, alice) ∧ isStaﬀOf(natalie, diana)
∧i
diana says mayGiveDrug(natalie, alice, qurol) to natalie
→ e
Fig. 5. A sketch of an accountability proof.
entry corresponding to item B11 above, together with a proof of
[B12] natalie mayGiveDrug(natalie, alice, qurol).
To illustrate a more complex proof, Diana’s proof for the delegation to Natalie
(B11 above) is more involved. To account for it, Diana has to prove that:
[H5, B1, B9] Diana Diana says mayGiveDrug(natalie, alice, qurol) to alice.
The actual proof involves a number of steps. Diana can use his proof ﬁnder to
generate the exact proof for him. In Figure 5 we sketch the proof. The auditor
can check this proof automatically, using the proof checker. We refer the interested
reader to earlier work for more details about the implementation of the tools [5].
Finally, to illustrate the use of use-once obligations, the next day Natalie gives
another dose of Qurol, in line with what Dr. Diana told her.
C1 Natalie administers the medicine.
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C2 Natalie notiﬁes billing that Qurol was given to Alice.
C3 Charlie logs this for later.
C4 Charlie bills Alice for the medicine.
C5 Charlie logs this, together with a reference to Natalie’s notiﬁcation (C3).
Notice that the policy (H7) allowing Charlie to bill Alice for the medicines contains
a use-once obligation (cf. Section 2): Each time someone gives drugs to Alice,
Charlie can add to Alice’s bill. Charlie needs to log the billing action, together with
a reference to the corresponding notiﬁcation by Alice [4]. In other words, when
billing Alice, Charlie has to state, in his log, to which notiﬁcation it belongs. This
allows the external auditor, described earlier, to check that each item on the bill
corresponds to a dose of Qurol administered by Natalie.
3 Discussion
The case-study shows how a-posteriori access control can be used in the EHR set-
ting. In this section we elaborate on the main advantages and the main drawbacks
of this approach.
A-posteriori versus a-priori
The advantage of a-posteriori access control is that it allows the medical staﬀ to
go ahead with their duties, without worrying about problems like expiration of
certiﬁcates, passwords or failing network connectivity to some authorization server.
These issues can be dealt with at a more convenient time. By deﬁnition a preventive
access control system does not provide this kind of ﬂexibility. In practice, an a-
priori access control system has to be extended with mechanisms by which users
can override the a-priori decisions of the access control mechanism [11]. These
overrides must be reviewed later on for legitimacy, and for this purpose users must
record the circumstances under which they needed to override. This logging is a
central part of the Audit Logic. Useful events or performed actions have to be
logged by the medical staﬀ, for the purpose of accountability. By keeping logs of
such events and actions, doctors and nurses can account to multiple auditors that
come at diﬀerent times. In a traditional a-priori access control system, on the other
hand, the authorizations are only checked once by a single authority, i.e. at the
moment access is requested.
A-posteriori access control has a characteristic drawback: it does not prevent
misbehavior, hence it does not give the robust security guarantees that are required
in e.g. military information systems. In many settings, a-posteriori access control
can not replace preventive access control at all because the costs of incidental misuse
are much higher than the costs of a (too) preventive security mechanism.
Many countries have adopted legislation that describes rather explicitly the re-
quirements for EHR systems [15,16]. Consider for example the summary of the US
act HIPAA [16]. The principal rule is as follows:
A covered entity may not use or disclose protected health information, except either:
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(1) as the Privacy Rule permits or requires; or (2) as the individual who is the sub-
ject of the information authorizes in writing. 3
The HIPAA act stresses that patients have the right to justiﬁcations of past disclo-
sures of their medical records. In HIPAA it is called Disclosure Accounting, being
the subject’s right to get an accounting of disclosures of its EHR in the past six
years.
The a-posteriori access control mechanism, described in this paper, provides a
formal deﬁnition of this accounting and the tools to automate such accounting.
Although not required in the HIPAA act, automation is convenient to be able to
run audit tools without human supervision, enhancing both the privacy and the
eﬃciency of the audits.
Finally, about the implementation of the law, the HIPAA act states that The
Privacy Rule does not require that every risk of an incidental use or disclosure of
protected health information be eliminated. Therefore, the main drawback of our
approach, i.e. that with a-posteriori access control we can not completely exclude
misuse, is in principle allowed for by the law.
Infrastructure
We outline the requirements with respect to the underlying infrastructure.
Actions are executed at the session layer. Here authentication and non-
repudiation is required, to be able to determine which users were responsible for
which actions. Once an action is executed, the evidence of its occurrence should be
safely stored for later, this is called an audit trail. Also, time-stamping of actions
is required, to be able to demonstrate that an action was not executed before an-
other, or before a required policy was received. Audit trails should provide auditors
with a transcript of all (or most) user actions, to detect misbehavior. Consider
the example in Figure 1. Here, a database system provides a secure log of past
queries to some auditor. On the other hand, the policy communications between
the two agents are ignored by the auditor. For example, the users may be using
some private email system to communicate (signed) authorizations. The auditors
do not monitor these exchanges. Additionally, besides using the logging facilities
of electronic systems such as databases and computers, audit trails can also be es-
tablished using cameras, key-loggers, RFID sensors, database query logs, etc. The
audit trails need protection from tampering [13], but this is already required for
accounting and security purposes [9].
Moving up to the application layer, the main requirement here is the presence
of a secure device for users to log the actions and events useful to them. Moreover,
both auditors and user may use the tools shown in Section 2 to ﬁnd and check
accountability proofs automatically. These evidences are used by the users in the
event of an audit. For example, suppose a doctor changes a medical ﬁle and a policy
states that in that case the corresponding patient should be notiﬁed. To justify his
actions later on, he should log the action of notifying the patient. The notiﬁcation
3 This was also illustrated in the scenario; patient Alice gave extra permissions to her doctor David.
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is executed at the session layer, where it may be caught in an audit trail. At the
same time the logging device must create a tuple containing the logged action, its
time-stamp and possibly other parameters, which can be used as evidence in an
audit later on [4]. To prevent that users forge their logs, some secure device is
needed that takes care of this logging.
At the application layer, audit-based access control has little impact, which
makes it rather suitable to implement across diﬀerent institutions, where many
diﬀerent kinds of legacy systems are used. For example, the databases schemas of
the involved organizations can remain the same and the ICT infrastructures would
not have to be re-designed from scratch.
Privacy and Trust
An important requirement for a-posteriori access control is that there must be some
mechanism in place to ensure that users can be held accountable for their actions,
i.e. that a user will not vanish after executing his (illegal) actions. This is necessary
for the trust of users in each other, and in the EHR system. In real life, this
is often done using a bail sum or by some legally binding agreement, such as an
employment contract. If this requirement is not met, malicious users can perform
actions and disappear before they can be held accountable. In our setting this
is particularly important, given the fact that users can give extra permissions to
others. A malicious user can set oﬀ a cascade of actions by other users.
A more complex aspect is trust management. We assumed for simplicity that
all users were equally trusted to utter security statements. However, consider the
case in which some unknown doctor made changes to the drug prescriptions for
Alice. Strictly speaking, Dr. David can trust another doctor, however, Dr. David’s
employer may require him to make a more complex trust decision that involves
checking the foreign doctor’s reputation and expertise area. Making such decisions
can be supported by using trust management (TM) systems [10]. On the one hand,
the TM system should give a full view of how users can be trusted, and on the
other hand, when an auditing authority ﬁnds that a user is not accountable, it
should report this to the TM system to decrease part the user’s reputation.
In practice, also in a-priori access control systems some authority checks the
system for ﬂaws or abuse by logging and auditing user behavior. In fact this is
considered to be essential in conventional access control [12]. Often, these audits
are conducted without using formal or public procedures. In the auditing approach
we have removed the a-priori access control, and provided a formal and automated
auditing procedure. Automation allows for fast routine audits, and is more privacy-
friendly than auditing by hand. It remains a question if the user’s perception of
privacy is any diﬀerent in either approach.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we show how the Audit Logic [4,7] can be used in the setting of
Electronic Health Records. We outlined the full architecture and we discussed the
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advantages and drawbacks of this approach, regarding ICT infrastructure and the
users’ privacy and trust.
We showed that our approach requires minimal changes to the infrastructure.
At the lower layers, secure audit trails, with all (or most) of the user actions, are
already required [9]. By minimizing the a-priori access control and relying on a-
posteriori access control we get a more ﬂexible system to adapt to the medical
information ﬂow. Yet the audit mechanism provides the necessary assurance, later
on, that the staﬀ complied to the relevant policies. A-posteriori access control is
convenient when authorizations are not available on the moment that access to
medical ﬁles is needed. Moreover, as mentioned before, this type of auditing is
required by legislation concerning EHR systems [16]. In the Audit Logic framework
such audits are performed by a formal and automated auditing procedure.
In the EHR setting, privacy is an important issue for both patients and medical
staﬀ. A-posteriori access control is in theory more intrusive to the user’s privacy
than a-priori access control. A-priori access control however is also coupled with
audits of logs and user actions [12,13]. An automatic audit procedure not only
enhances the privacy of the patients, but also that of the medical staﬀ, wary perhaps
of human auditors that go through the logs by hand. Formal and public auditing
procedures make the privacy protection mechanism also more transparent to the
patients as well as to the medical staﬀ. In the future we wish to investigate how
we can control the actions of the auditors in turn and how we can achieve maximal
privacy of the (honest) users with respect the auditors.
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A Appendix
For the sake of brevity, the two sequences of actions depicted in Section 2 are
formalized here.
The ﬁrst sequence, where patient Alice visits Dr. David in his oﬃce:
A1 comm(hospital, david, φh).
A3 comm(alice, david, isDoctorOf(david, alice)).
A6 read(david,md alice).
A7 comm(alice, david, φa).
A9 update(david,md alice).
The second sequence, where Alice arrives, unexpectedly, in the hospital, while
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Dr. Diana is on duty:
B1 comm(natalie, diana, isOnStaﬀOf(natalie, diana)).
B2 read(diana,md alice).
B3 update(diana,md alice).
B4 giveDrug(natalie, alice, qurol).
B5 notify(natalie, charlie, qurol, alice).
B7 bill(charlie, alice, qurol).
B9 comm(alice, diana, isDoctorOf(diana, alice)).
B11 comm(diana, natalie,mayGiveDrug(natalie, alice, qurol)).
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